When Alice and Bob want to securely evaluate a function of their shared inputs, they typically first express the function as a (boolean or arithmetic) circuit and then securely evaluate that circuit, gate-by-gate. In other words, a secure protocol for evaluating f is typically obtained in a non-black-box-way from f itself. Consequently, secure computation protocols have high overhead (in communication & computation) that is directly linked to the circuit-description complexity of f .
Introduction
In cryptography, a black-box construction is one that uses only the input/output behavior of its components [ir89, rtv04] . By contrast, a non-black-box construction relies on the code of its components. Understanding exactly when non-black-box techniques are necessary is important for cryptography, since black-box constructions are typically much more efficient (in their computation and/or communication) than comparable non-black-box constructions.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows mutually distrusting parties to securely evaluate a function f on their shared inputs. This powerful paradigm is well-known in the theoretical community but appears to be seldom used in practice. As a result, much current work focuses on improving the efficiency of MPC constructions to facilitate more widespread use. A recent line of work (see [hik + 11] and followup works [ips08, cdsmw09, pw09] ) has focused on improving efficiency by removing certain non-black-box techniques used in all earlier work. In particular, these results focus on the black-box use of the underlying cryptographic primitives (that is, oneway functions, trapdoor permutations, or standalone-secure oblivious transfer) used in the protocol.
One goal in this paper is to make explicit another non-black-box step inherent to all existing general-purpose MPC protocols. To build a secure protocol for a function f , the function must first be expressed as a low-level circuit ([y86, gmw87] use boolean circuits, [ccd88, bgw88] use arithmetic circuits, and [k88] uses branching programs). Then, the protocol proceeds to securely evaluate the circuit, gate by gate. In other words, a secure protocol for f is non-black-box in its usage of f itself. While this framework provides a straight-forward way to achieve complete generality, it also inherently ties the efficiency (communication, computation, or both) of the protocol to the circuit-representation complexity of f . For this reason, an important line of research has streamlined many aspects of this non-black-box dependence, including techniques for optimizing circuits for MPC [ks08, pssw09] and exploring alternative circuit representations [aik11] .
It is unreasonable to expect that we can avoid this non-black-box step for general-purpose MPC (indeed, our results explicitly confirm this). Still, it is important to understand exactly to what extent the non-black-box dependence is inherent. For which special-purpose secure computation tasks can we avoid dependence on the code of the target function altogether (and hopefully construct highly efficient protocols)?
Overview of the Results
We initiate the theoretical study of when a protocol can securely compute f without "knowing" the code of f . When considering a (standard) secure protocol for a functionality f , that choice of f is fixed and the protocol is allowed to depend arbitrarily on f . In this case, it is not meaningful to place any syntactic restrictions on the protocol (e.g., that it use oracle access to a subroutine implementing f ), since the protocol could have a circuit for f hard-coded anyway.
Instead, we model a protocol that "does not know" the code of its target functionality in the following way. The protocol is a pair of oracle machines that, when instantiated with any f from some larger class of functionalities, securely emulates a functionality related to f . By considering large classes of functionalities, we prevent the protocol from hard-coding relevant circuit representations of the functionalities.
Definition (Informal). Let F be an ideal (2-party) functionality implemented as an oracle machine, and let C be a class of functions. Then a functionally-black-box (FBB) protocol for F C is a pair of oracle machines (π A , π B ) such that, for all f ∈ C, the instantiated protocol (π
As a natural example, C can be a class of functions that take two inputs, and F can be the simple functionality which collects x from Alice, y from Bob, queries its oracle to obtain z = f (x, y), and gives the result to both parties (secure function evaluation). Or, F can be the functionality which collects (x, w) from Alice, and then gives x to Bob if f (x, w) = 1 (zero-knowledge proof).
We point out that it is only the protocol which must treat f as a black-box. In particular, the order of quantifiers is such that adversaries and simulators attacking the f -instantiated protocol may depend arbitrarily on the choice of f (and hence could be said to "know" the code of f ).
We put forth the FBB property as a necessary condition for highly efficient, practical MPC protocols. This work therefore focuses on a theoretical understanding of the FBB property, as a proxy for practical efficiency. However, FBB alone is not a sufficient condition for practical protocols. Indeed, the protocols that we construct in this work may not be considered "practical."
Autoreducibility characterization for 2-party passive security. In computational complexity theory, the notion of autoreducibility is a way to measure the "structure" within a set. Very generally, a set A is autoreducible if there exists an oracle machine M such that M A (x) = A(x), and yet M 's oracle queries do not "depend too much" on x. An instance of autoreducibility which shows up frequently in cryptography is the notion of random self-reducibility. In that case, the oracle queries of M are distributed independently of the input x.
We define a variant of autoreducibility called 2-hiding autoreducibility, which subsumes random self-reducibility and has some similarities to "2-oracle instance-hiding" autoreducibility defined by Beaver & Feigenbaum [bf90] . Intuitively, 2-hiding autoreducibility requires a single oracle machine M such that M f (x, y) = f (x, y) for every f in a large class C; furthermore, half of M 's oracle queries are "independent" of x and the other half are "independent" of y, in some sense. We then show that 2-hiding autoreducibility completely characterizes FBB feasibility (for 2-party deterministic secure function evaluation):
Theorem (Informal). Let C be a class of 2-input functions. Then functionally-black-box secure evaluation of C is possible against semi-honest adversaries, in the presence of an arbitrary trusted setup, if and only if C is 2-hiding autoreducible.
We also emphasize that achieving the FBB property is not simply a matter of providing a very powerful trusted setup to the parties. Indeed, to be meaningful, the trusted setup must be the same for every f ∈ C. Since it is only the parties and not the trusted setup that have access to f , it is not immediate that even a powerful setup can be useful. Subsequently, our characterization can be used to give impossibility results that hold even in the presence of an arbitrary setup. Without loss of generality, one can assume the presence of a complete trusted setup such as the oblivious transfer functionality [ips08] , or a common reference string [clos02] .
Non-trivial FBB feasibility. There is a trivial sense in which some classes of functionalities admit FBB protocols. We say (informally) that a class C is learnable if it is possible to efficiently obtain a circuit for f using only oracle access for f , for every f ∈ C. Then every learnable class admits an FBB protocol of the following form: the parties independently query f to obtain a (canonical) circuit that evaluates f ; they then use a standard general-purpose construction such as [gmw87, clos02, ips08] . Thus, the notion of functionally-black-box is most meaningful when considering non-learnable classes of functionalities. (We note that a similar triviality occurs in the context of obfuscation [bgi + 01], with respect to this same notion of learnability.) Informally, it is possible to "securely compute f without knowing the code of f " if f belongs to some class C that admits FBB secure protocols but is not learnable from oracle queries.
Using our autoreducibility characterization, we explicitly show that non-trivial FBB protocols are possible. That is, learnability is a strictly stronger condition than FBB feasibility. Intuitively, learnability requires the entire function to be deduced from oracle access, while our autoreducibility characterization only requires M to deduce the correct answer on a single, given input. We show a class of functions (related to blind signatures) that admits FBB protocols, but is not explicitly learnable from oracle queries. Thus, in some cases it is in fact possible to securely compute f "without knowing" the code of f . Infeasibility of PRF evaluation. As another demonstration of our autoreducibility characterization, we show that it is impossible to securely evaluate arbitrary PRFs (where one party holds the seed and the other holds the PRF input) 1 in an FBB manner. Impossibility holds even if arbitrary trusted setups are available, and even if security is only required against semi-honest adversaries. The result also easily extends to the class of (strong) PRPs. We leave open the question of whether a natural subclass of PRFs admits FBB-secure protocols (in a non-trivial way).
Sufficient conditions for malicious security. We define another variant of autoreducibility, called 1-hiding autoreducibility. The definition is similar to that of 2-hiding autoreducibility, except that in 1-hiding autoreducibility all of the oracle machine's queries are independent of both x and y. We then show that 1-hiding autoreducible is a sufficient condition for FBB feasibility against malicious adversaries.
We also identify the main technical challenge in achieving malicious security for FBB protocols -namely, giving parties a means to ensure that the other party is locally responding to its oracle queries faithfully according to the agreed-upon f .
Zero-knowledge. Zero-knowledge proofs are perhaps the most widely studied subclass of secure computation tasks. ZK proofs are often the sole source of non-black-box behavior (and thus the efficiency bottleneck) in a protocol.
Let f be a deterministic function and define the relation R f (x, w) = 1 ⇔ f (w) = x. We show that FBB zero-knowledge proofs are impossible for the class of relations {R f | f is a OWF}. In fact, our impossibility result is much stronger, ruling out even honest-verifier witness-hiding (instead of zero-knowledge), arguments rather than proofs; impossibility further applies to basic standalone security, and holds in the presence of arbitrary trusted setups.
Other Related Work
The notion of autoreducibility has proven to be a fruitful tool in complexity theory for quantifying the amount of structure in a set. For a gentle introduction to research on this topic, see [s08, a10] .
In cryptography, autoreducibility has already been recognized as a tool for several interesting applications. Abadi, Feigenbaum, & Kilian [afk89] used "instance hiding" autoreducibility to reason about what would in today's parlance be called a form of outsourced computation. Here, a client wishes to compute f (x) using access to a powerful trusted server who can evaluate the function f ; the client wants to learn f (x) but does not want his queries to f to leak any information about x. The notion was later extended by Beaver & Feigenbaum [bf90] to a setting involving multiple (non-colluding) servers. A summary of this line of work was given by Brassard [b90] . Beaver et al. [bfkr97] also used autoreducibility to construct efficient perfect zero-knowledge proofs.
The question of FBB protocols requires a fundamentally different style of autoreducibility than studied in previous works. First, existing definitions consider an oracle machine which is required to work only for a single fixed language (or function); whereas here we require a single oracle machine which works for any function from a large class. Second, we must explicitly consider functions on two inputs, and make a distinction between oracle queries that depend on each of the inputs. In addition, our notion of "query independence" is specific to our application of secure protocols. Finally, many previous definitions of autoreducibility allow the oracle machine to be instantiated with an oracle that is distinct from (but depends on) the required output function -e.g., an oracle machine computes the function f when given oracle access to g, a low-degree encoding of f .
1 Evaluating the AES block cipher in this way is now a relatively standard performance benchmark for MPC protocols [l10] .
Preliminaries
A probability p(n) is negligible if for all, c > 0, p(n) < n −c for all but finitely many n. We write
When discussing security of MPC protocols, we use Canetti's framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [c01] . The low-level details of the security model are not crucial to our results. We do, however, make one distinction about notation:
In the MPC literature, the notation π f often refers to a protocol π where the parties can use a shared ideal functionality f (the f -hybrid model, in UC parlance). In this work, write π f to instead denote a protocol machine equipped with (local) oracle access to independent instances of f . In that sense, our notation reflects the complexity-theoretic idea of an oracle computation.
Definition 2.1 (Related-Key security for PRFs [bk03] ). Let Φ be a class of functions over {0,
Bit b is chosen at random and s is chosen uniformly from {0, 1} k . If b = 0 then queries of the form O(φ, x), where φ ∈ Φ and x ∈ {0, 1} k , are answered as
If ⊗ is a group operation on {0, 1} k , and Φ = {φ ∆ | ∆ ∈ {0, 1} k } where φ ∆ (x) = x ⊗ ∆, then we say that Φ is group-induced. Bellare & Cash [bc10] give constructions of Φ-RKA-PRFs (and PRPs) for group-induced Φ.
Definition 2.2 (Blind signatures [c82] ). Let Σ = (KeyGen, Sign, Ver) be a signature scheme. A blind signature protocol for Σ is one in which the client has input (1 k , m), the signer has input (1 k , sk), and the client receives output Sign(sk, m). The blindness condition is that the view of the signer is statistically independent of m.
Importantly, the definition defers to the security condition separately for each instantiation (π f A , π f B ). Thus, adversaries and simulators attacking the f -instantiated protocol in the security definition can depend arbitrarily on the choice of f ∈ C. This models the fact that adversaries are not restricted to use f as a black-box. Indeed, the intent is to characterize convenience/efficiency for the honest parties, without compromising any level of security.
Instantiations used in this work. Let F sfe be the non-reactive functionality that takes input x from Alice and y from Bob, queries its oracle f to obtain z = f (x, y), and gives the output to both parties. Then an FBB protocol for F C sfe would allow the protocols to have only black-box access to the function f being evaluated.
As another example, let F fzk be the functionality that takes input w from Alice, queries its oracle f to obtain x = f (w), and gives output x to Bob. When instantiated with function f , F f fzk is essentially a zero-knowledge argument (of knowledge) functionality for statements of the form "∃w : x = f (w)". Note that in this setting we allow parties to have access to the function f rather than the (more restricted) NP relation R f (x, w) = 1 ⇔ f (w) = x.
Simple observations. Suppose C is learnable in the following sense. There exists a PPT oracle TM M such that with overwhelming probability (in k), M f (1 k , 1 t ) outputs a circuit that agrees with f on {0, 1} t , for all f ∈ C. In the simple case where M will always output a canonical circuit, then an FBB protocol can be obtained by having both parties (independently) running M , and then using an appropriate non-FBB protocol construction on the resulting circuit. Even if M does not reliably output the same circuit each time, an FBB protocol can be obtained using the approach outlined later in Theorem 5.2 (the class is 1-hiding autoreducible via the oracle machine which runs
Suppose C contains only functions whose input domains are constant-sized (i.e., not growing in size with k). Then C is (canonically) learnable in the above sense, by exhaustively querying the function. For this reason, we only consider classes which contain functions over infinite domains.
Classification for Semi-Honest Security
In this section we define a notion of autoreducibility, and then show that it completely characterizes feasibility of FBB MPC protocols against semi-honest adversaries.
Definition 4.1. Let C denote a class of functions on two inputs. Let M be a PPT oracle machine, and suppose each oracle query is tagged with a label i ∈ {1, 2} (say, by setting some internal variable at the time of the query). Then for i ∈ {1, 2} define Q i [M, f ; z] to be the random variable containing the sequence of oracle queries made with label i during the computation M f (z). We say that C is 2-hiding autoreducible if there exists a PPT oracle machine M such that for all f ∈ C:
1. For all x, y, we have that
2. There exists a PPT machine S f,1 such that for all x, y, the following ensembles are indistinguishable (in k):
3. There exists a PPT machine S f,2 such that for all x, y, the following ensembles are indistinguishable (in k):
In other words, M is able to use oracle access to f to determine f (x, y), yet its type-1 oracle queries to f are "independent" of y and its type-2 queries are "independent" of x, in some sense. A special case is when M 's type-1 queries are distributed independently of y (and type-2 queries independently of x).
We now give our main classification for semi-honest security, which holds in the presence of arbitrary trusted setups. Without loss of generality, we can take the trusted setup to be the oblivious transfer functionality, which we denote by F ot .
Theorem 4.2. There is a FBB protocol for F C sfe secure against PPT semi-honest adversaries in the F ot -hybrid model if and only if C is 2-hiding autoreducible.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that the oracle machine M satisfies the definition of 2-hiding autoreducibility for C. Without loss of generality, assume that the number of queries made by M depends only on the input 1 k (i.e., it does not depend on x or y), and that M strictly alternates between type-1 and type-2 queries. We then define the ideal functionality F M as in Figure 1 .
The functionality maintains a configuration of the machine M in an internal variable S. This variable is manipulated by commands from Alice and Bob, as described below. After every such input, the functionality simulates M with configuration S. If M terminates with output z, give output (out, z) to both parties and halt. If M queries its oracle with a type-1 query q, then give output (query, q) to Alice and (query, ⊥) to Bob, and wait. If M queries its oracle with a type-2 query q, then give output (query, ⊥) to Alice and (query, q) to Bob, and wait.
1. On inputs (init, x) from Alice and (init, y) from Bob, initialize S as the initial configuration of oracle machine M on input (1 k , x, y), where k is the global security parameter. Then simulate M as described above. 2. On input (resp, r) from Alice, ensure that in configuration S, M is awaiting a reply to a type-1 oracle query (otherwise abort). Update S to reflect a response r on the oracle response tape, then simulate M as described above. 3. On input (resp, r) from Bob, do the same as the previous step except ensure that M is awaiting a reply to a type-2 oracle query. There is a UC-secure protocol for F M in the F ot -hybrid model, so it suffices to design a FBB MPC protocol for F C sfe in the F M -hybrid model. (Note that the same F M will be used in the protocol for each f ∈ C.) The FBB protocol for F f sfe , f ∈ C, is relatively straight-forward. On inputs x for Alice and y for Bob, the parties send (init, x) and (init, y) to F M , respectively. Whenever a party receives output (query, q) from F M , for q = ⊥, that party uses its local oracle to compute r = f (q), and gives (resp, r) to F M . When the parties receive (out, z) from F M , they output z.
Clearly the protocol is FBB. To show that this protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries, it suffices to show that the view of an honest party can be simulated in the ideal world. The simulator for a semi-honest Alice is as follows. Fix f ∈ C and recall that the simulator for the f -instantiated protocol can depend arbitrarily on f . The simulator receives Alice's input x from the environment. When Alice sends (init, x) to F M , the simulator sends x to the ideal functionality and receives z = f (x, y). The simulator then computes Q ← S f,1 (1 k , z, x), where S f,1 is the machine guaranteed by the 2-hiding autoreducibility definition. For each query q in the sequence Q, the simulator gives (query, q) and then (query, ⊥) to Alice on behalf of F M . Finally, the simulator gives output (out, z) to Alice on behalf of F M . It is clear that Alice's view is computationally indistinguishable from that of the real interaction, by the guarantees of S f,1 . The protocol is essentially symmetric with respect to Alice and Bob, and so security holds for a semi-honest Bob as well. Note that since we consider only semi-honest security, the adversary will indeed provide correct oracle responses to F M . Indeed, a malicious party could easily invalidate this security argument by providing incorrect oracle responses to F M .
(⇒) Suppose π = (π A , π B ) is an FBB protocol for F C sfe in the F ot -hybrid model. Define an oracle machine M as follows: It internally simulates instances of π A , π B , and F ot as in their protocol interaction. On input (1 k , x, y) to M , it gives input (1 k , x) to π A and input (1 k , y) to π B . It then simulates the three subcomponents in the natural way. Whenever π A makes an oracle query, M makes the same query as a type-1 query and returns the result to the π A component. Similarly, queries made by π B are made as type-2 queries. The final output of π A is taken to be the output of M .
By the correctness of the protocol π, we have that the output of M is equal to f (x, y) with overwhelming probability for all x, y, when instantiated with f as its oracle. Now fix a particular f ∈ C. The security of π instantiated with f implies the existence of a simulator S in the F f sfe -ideal model. We define S f,1 to do the following, on input (1 k , f (x, y), x): First, run S on input (1 k , f (x, y)) against a semi-honest corrupt Alice with input (1 k , x). Then S generates a simulated view for Alice; output the sequence of simulated oracle queries contained in Alice's view. By the soundness of S, the output of S f,1 is indistinguishable from the sequence of type-1 queries made by M , as required for 2-hiding autoreducibility. The required S f,2 algorithm is defined symmetrically.
Discussion. The protocol for realizing F M in the F ot -hybrid model uses the oracle machine M in a highly non-black-box manner. So while the protocol is black-box in the code of f ∈ C, it is not black-box in the code of M . However, we note that the code of M may be significantly simpler than that of f ∈ C (for example, when M 's oracle queries are made uniformly), and also that M is fixed for the entire class C.
A Positive Example, and Comparison to Learnability
Using our characterization, we can show that FBB feasibility is a strictly weaker condition than learnability (as defined in Section 3). In other words, it is indeed possible to securely evaluate certain classes of functions without "knowing" the code of the function.
Let Σ = (KeyGen, Sign, Ver) be an existentially unforgeable signature scheme. Without loss of generality, we assume that the Sign algorithm is deterministic (it can be derandomized using a PRF). Let (π C , π S ) denote a blind signature protocol for this scheme (Definition 2.2), where C is the client and S is the signer. We call a blind signature protocol modular if the π S protocol does not use the signing key except via oracle access to Sign(sk, ·). That is, the signer executes the protocol as π
Sign(sk,·) S
(1 k , vk). As a concrete example, the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature scheme [bls01] supports such a blind signature protocol [b03] .
For a signing key sk, define the function S sk (x, y) = Sign(sk, x).
Lemma 4.3. If Σ has a modular and semi-honest secure blind signature protocol, then the class C Σ = {S sk | sk ∈ {0, 1} * } is 2-hiding autoreducible but not learnable. (In fact, the class C Σ is 1-hiding autoreducible; defined later in Section 5.)
Proof. We construct a machine M for the definition of 2-hiding autoreducibility. On input (1 k , x, y), the machine M simulates instances of π C (1 k , vk, x) and π
(1 k , vk) in the natural way. Whenever π S queries its oracle on message m, M makes a type-1 query (m, ⊥) and uses the result as the response to π S . Finally, M uses the final output of π C as its own output.
By the correctness of the π protocol, M satisfies the desired correctness condition for 2-hiding autoreducibility. From the blindness property of π, it follows that the oracle queries made by π S in the protocol are distributed independently of x. Hence, the entire set of queries made by M (all type-1) are distributed independently of (x, y).
The fact that C Σ is not learnable follows from the existential unforgeability of Σ. Suppose a machine M , using oracle access to S sk for a randomly chosen sk, is able to output a circuit correctly computing S sk . Then the following is an attack in the unforgeability game for Σ: On input (1 k , vk) run M (1 k ). Whenever M makes an oracle query (x, y), request a signature on x in the game and return the result to M . When M outputs a circuit C, choose any x * such that no query of the form (x * , ·) was ever made. Then run C(x * , ⊥), which by assumption is a valid signature on x * ; hence, a forgery. 2
A Negative Example: Infeasibility of PRFs
In this section, we treat pseudorandom functions as functions of two arguments: the first argument being the seed and the second argument being the PRF input. Thus, a functionality evaluating a PRF in our terminology corresponds to a functionality which takes a seed from Alice and an input from Bob, and evaluates the PRF accordingly.
We now show that FBB protocols are impossible for the class of all pseudorandom functions. While this claim is sensible at an intuitive level (pseudorandomness precludes significant structure like that required for 2-hiding autoreducibility), the proof has some subtlety. To apply the security of the PRF we must have its seed (secretly) chosen at random, whereas in the 2-hiding autoreducibility definition, the oracle machine is given Alice's input (taken to be the PRF seed) and can arbitrarily query the unseeded PRF f (·, ·) as an oracle. We show that, given a PRF secure against related-key attacks, we can "embed" an additional seed into the PRF oracle in a way that allows the PRF security to apply to the 2-hiding autoreducibility interaction.
Lemma 4.4. Define C prf = {f | f is a PRF}. If Φ-RKA-secure PRFs exist for group-induced Φ (Definition 2.1), and injective PRGs exist, then C prf is not 2-hiding autoreducible, and thus there is no FBB protocol for F Cprf sfe , even against semi-honest adversaries and in the F ot -hybrid model.
Additionally, we point out that the proof goes through with minimal modification with respect to the class of pseudorandom permutations (as before, assuming the existence of RKA-secure PRPs). Regarding the condition in the lemma statement, Bellare & Cash [bc10] give constructions of suitable PRFs (and PRPs) under either the DDH or DLIN assumptions, and also assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions.
Proof. Let f be a PRF secure against group-induced RKA attacks. For concreteness and clarity, we write the allowed group operation as ⊕. Let g : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} 2k be an injective PRG and define the following function for an arbitrary string s:
So that f s is defined for inputs of arbitrary length, we assume that the fixed string s is padded with zeroes or truncated to the appropriate length (|g(x)|) in the expression s ⊕ g(x). Now we claim that for each (fixed) string s ∈ {0, 1} * , the function f s is a PRF (interpreting x as its seed). Consider an efficient oracle machine A. We have:
In the above, R is a random oracle; thus f s is a PRF. Indistinguishability holds due to the pseudorandomness of g, the fact that ⊕ is a group operation, and the pseudorandomness of f , respectively. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that oracle machine M satisfies the condition required for 2-hiding autoreducibility of the class of pseudorandom functions. Then for every PRF h and all strings x and y, we have that Pr[M h (1 k , x, y) = h(x, y)] is overwhelming in k. In particular, the same probability is overwhelming for random choice of x, y ∈ {0, 1} k , s ∈ {0, 1} 2k , and setting h = f s (since each f s is a PRF). In the RKA-PRF security game for f , the oracle machine is allowed to make queries of the form (φ, z) and obtain either f (s ⊕ φ, z) for randomly chosen s, or R φ (z), where each R φ is an independent random function. Hence,
Here, each R φ , and finally R, is chosen as a random function. The last equality holds from the fact that g is injective.
From this we see that when the machine M is given inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} k chosen randomly, and an oracle f s with s ∈ {0, 1} 2k chosen randomly, it must query the oracle on (x, y) with overwhelming probability. By an averaging argument, there must exist a negligible function δ and strings {s k } k∈N , each s k ∈ {0, 1} 2k , such that:
When M queries its oracle on its given input, this query is either a type-1 or a type-2 query. Thus, there must exist additional {b k } k∈N , each b k ∈ {1, 2}, satisfying:
Importantly, even for a fixed s k , the function f s k is a PRF and thus in the class C for which the properties of M apply. So for each s k , there is a corresponding simulator S k that takes input 1 k , f s k (x, y), and either x or y (depending on b k ), and whose output is indistinguishable from
Then we can use such a simulator to invert the PRG g with probability essentially half. The attack uses the non-uniform advice
By our assumption, Q is a polynomial-length list that, with probability essentially 1/2, contains a value (a, b) such that β ∈ {g(a), g(b)}. Thus, we can output the preimage of β with probability essentially 1/2. Since g is a PRG, and hence a one-way function, we have achieved a contradiction. Thus, the class of PRFs is not 2-hiding autoreducible.
Discussion & interpretation. The proof considers only PRFs of a certain form. Let f be a fixed, Φ-RKA-secure PRF as above and g a fixed, length-doubling injective PRG. Then define C f,g
). More precisely, we have shown that C f,g prf (⊆ C prf ) is not 2-hiding autoreducible.
Admittedly, the class C f,g prf is not the most natural subclass of PRFs. The result shown here leaves open the possibility that some other class C ⊆ C prf of PRFs is 2-hiding autoreducible (and not in a trivial sense, as when |C| < ∞). For instance, let F g denote the well-known GGM construction [ggm86] applied to a PRG g. Is the class C ggm = {F g | g is a PRG} ⊆ C prf 2-hiding autoreducible? 3
Results for Malicious Security
In this section we describe two constructions of FBB MPC protocols that achieve security against malicious adversaries.
Autoreducibility Criterion. Our first construction is similar in spirit to the one given in Section 4. Like that construction, it is based on a variant of autoreducibility.
Definition 5.1. Let C denote a class of functions of two inputs. Let M be a PPT oracle machine and define Q[M, f ; z] to be the random variable containing the sequence of oracle queries made during the computation M f (z). We say that C is 1-hiding autoreducible if there exists a PPT oracle machine M such that for all f ∈ C:
2. There exist PPT machine S f,1 and S f,2 such that for all x, y, the ensembles {S f,1 (1 k , f (x, y), y)} k , {S f,2 (1 k , f (x, y), y)} k , and {Q[M, f ; 1 k , x, y]} k are indistinguishable in k.
In other words, M is able to use oracle access to f to determine f (x, y), yet its oracle queries to f are "independent" of x and of y in some sense. A special case of Definition 5.1 is when the M 's oracle queries are distributed uniformly (analogous to the definition of random self-reducibility, except defined with respect to a class of functions).
Theorem 5.2. If C is 1-hiding autoreducible, then F C sfe has a FBB, UC-secure (i.e., against malicious adversaries) protocol in the F ot -hybrid model.
Proof sketch. The construction is quite similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Both parties access an ideal functionality F M which carries out an execution of the machine M from the definition of 1-hiding autoreducibility. In this setting, however, F M gives output to both parties whenever M makes an oracle query. It then waits for responses from both Alice and Bob, and aborts if the two parties give different responses. Otherwise, it continues its simulation of M , using the parties' response as the oracle response. As before, when the simulation of M finishes, F M gives the output to both parties.
The simulator for a corrupt Alice in the f -instantiated protocol is as follows. When Alice gives input (init, x) to F M , the simulator sends x to the ideal functionality and receives output z = f (x, y). Then the simulator runs (q 1 , . . . , q t ) ← S f,1 (1 k , z, x). For i ∈ [t], the simulator gives output (query, q i ) to Alice on behalf of F M , and aborts if Alice responds with anything but (resp, f (q i )). Recall that the simulator can depend arbitrarily on f and can therefore compute and verify f (q i ). Finally, the simulator gives (out, z) to Alice and delivers the output in the ideal model. Soundness of this simulation follows from the definition of 1-hiding autoreducibility. The simulation for corrupt Bob is analogous.
The importance of proving correctness of oracle responses. In this section we identify what appears to be the crucial challenge of achieving security against malicious adversaries. Namely, we show that, without loss of generality (in the F ot -hybrid model), even malicious parties can be forced to execute their protocol machines honestly. This leaves their oracle responses to these protocol machines as their only opportunity to deviate from the protocol.
Thus, the challenge is for each party to convince the other party that correct oracle responses have been provided to the protocol machines, though the contents of these oracle queries are, in general, private.
Let π = (π A , π B ) be an FBB protocol in the F ot -hybrid model. Without loss of generality, assume that each party makes exactly one oracle query in the time between receiving a message and sending a message. Define the related functionality F π , which does the following:
1. Simulate π A , π B , and F ot in the natural way, with inputs of Alice being fed into π A , outputs of π A being given to Alice, and likewise for Bob with π B . 2. Whenever π A makes oracle query q, Give (query, q) to Alice and (query, ⊥) to Bob, and wait. 3. Upon receiving inputs (resp, r) from Alice, ensure that π A is currently waiting for an oracle response (otherwise abort). Continue the simulation of π A , π B , and F ot taking r as the oracle response for π A . 4. Act analogously to the previous two steps when π B makes an oracle query, exchanging the roles of Alice and Bob.
A UC-secure protocol for F π exists in the F ot -hybrid model. Then the natural protocol -in which both parties send inputs to and report non-query outputs from F π , and respond to each (query, q) with (resp, f (q)) -is as secure as the π protocol running in the F ot -hybrid model, even in the FBB sense. Thus we see that, without loss of generality, malicious parties deviate from the protocol only in their oracle responses.
The construction in the proof of Theorem 4.2 can be seen as one way to provide a mechanism for "proving" to the other party that one's oracle queries are answered faithfully. Namely, insist that both parties always ask the same queries, and compare the results for equality.
However, providing such a "proof" mechanism in general seems to be quite challenging, as a party's oracle queries may leak information about her input if shown to the other party. Such a proof mechanism would permit a "compiler" from passive-to UC-security (in the F ot -hybrid model) that preserves the FBB property, similar in spirit to the well-known GMW compiler [gmw87] . 4 The approach outlined above (i.e., delegating the oracle machines to a trusted functionality) can be used to enforce honest execution of the protocol machines, so all that would remain is to enforce honest responses to each party's oracle queries.
FBB Zero-Knowledge Proofs (and relaxations)
If f is a deterministic function, then F f fzk (defined in Section 3) is essentially a zero-knowledge proof functionality for the preimage relation R f (x, w) = 1 ⇔ f (w) = x.
Theorem 6.1. Define C owf = {f | f is a OWF}. If injective one-way functions exist, then there is no standalone-secure, FBB, honest-verifier witness-hiding protocol for F Cowf fzk , even in the presence of an arbitrary trusted setup.
We emphasize that only plain standalone-secure security is required, and that the protocol is not assumed to be a proof (argument) of knowledge. In particular, the above theorem rules out essentially any interesting relaxation of zero-knowledge proofs for the class of relations in question.
Proof. Suppose such a protocol exists, and call its algorithms (P f , V f ). When the statement "∃w : R f (x, w)" is being proven, the honest prover runs P f (1 n , w) and the honest verifier runs V f (1 n , x).
Let f be an injective, length-increasing OWF f . In an interaction involving an honest verifier with input x, let E denote the event that his view contains a query to the oracle on a preimage of x. If Pr w [E | P f (1 n , w) V f (1 n , f (w))] is non-negligible in n (over choice of random w ← {0, 1} n ), then we contradict the (honest verifier) witness-hiding property of the protocol.
So assume that this probability is negligible. Furthermore, in the interaction P f (1 n , w) V f (1 n , f (w)), the verifier accepts with overwhelming probability due to the completeness property.
Then by an averaging argument, there exists a negligible function δ and strings w 1 , w 2 , . . ., with |w k | = k, such that Pr[E | P f (1 n , w n ) V f (1 n , f (w n ))] ≤ δ(n). Now for each n, let z n be a string not in the image of f ({0, 1} n ), since f is length-increasing. Define:
Now f n is also a OWF and hence the security properties of the P, V protocol hold when instantiated with f n . Note that R f (f (w n ), w n ) = 1 but R f n (f (w n ), w n ) = 0, since f is injective. Conditioned on V not querying its oracle on input w n (an event which we assume happens with negligible probability), the outcomes P f (1 n , w n ) V f (1 n , f (w n )) and P f (1 n , w n ) V f n (1 n , f (w n )) are identical. That is, the verifier accepts with overwhelming probability when instantiated with either f or f n . Then when the prover runs the honest protocol with oracle f and input w n , it constitutes a violation of soundness against an honest verifier instantiated with f n . More specifically, in such an interaction the honest verifier is instantiated with oracle f n yet accepts a statement about R f n that is false.
